Journalist FAQs


Advice on terminology: lab-modified self-spreading viruses are unfortunately  referred to using a  number of different names all of which mean exactly the same thing (at least as far as we can determine), these include: 

  • transmissible (this is probably the most scientifically accurate term)
  • self-disseminating
  • contagious
  • self-spreading (which we have elected to use)
  • horizontally transferable

They all indicate that a virus has been intentionally developed to retain some capacity to transmit between individual hosts when released into the environment (in most proposals the viral hosts mammal is a single target species). 

Terms you might want to avoid: The term infectious is also occasionally used synonymously with self-spreading, but it should generally be avoided as it has a technical meaning that is distinct from all the above terms. The use of the recent term "transferable-vaccines” is also problematic in our opinion.


sort of disclaimers: The questions addressed in this website cover a very  wide range of issues.  Equally, many key features of the development programs remain unclear (we try to highlight where this is the case).  Consequently, despite our best efforts there may be inaccuracies on this and other pages on this website. We undertake to correct mistakes when we have been made aware of them.

Some of the topics addressed here are very complex and that among the 6 authors of the Science  article there is not necessarily 

  • Shared expertise on all points
  • Agreement about  the nuances and subtleties of every point. Though on the key issues addressed in the Science article there is unanimity 

This is actually common to all multi-author articles.


The format of the Policy Forum in Science, requires only 15 cited articles, this meant that many very valuable sources could not be cited. Consequently, we very much apologise to our fellow researchers and journalists where we have been unable to cite their contributions.  50 references were cited during the peer review process, this web site is in part an effort to show the importance of these works. 

This page provides more expansive referencing of key points in the article, link to additional sources and citations.


What our article is about 

  • It is an effort to increase awareness and understanding of the science  behind self-spreading modified viruses.
  • To place self-spreading modified viruses  in a context of historical cycles of interest in these outwardly attractive approaches.
  • Makes a very limited number of constructive proposals as to how the current absence of discussion, --despite ongoing development--, could be most rapidly be redressed.
  • Raises the question of wether technological breakthroughs on the  distant horizon are the only focus of worthy of attention in terms of risk mitigation.


What our article is not about 

  • It is not primarily about biosafety - though this is a very important issue that will need to be considered at a level of detail not appropriate for our article
  • It is not about  valuable viral techniques intended to be confined inside secure facilities  e.g.  within hospitals, research facilities or production facilities (even if they may be outdoors).
  • It is not about viruses that have not been modified in a laboratory. Consequently, our article is not about the rabbit control viruses myxomatosis, RHDV or the  live oral vaccine against adenovirus infection used  for US military recruits.
  • It is not about modified viruses that were not intentionally developed to be self-spreading. Consequently, our article is not about (1) rabies wildlife oral-bait vaccines, (2) Sabin type 2 polio vaccine (3) a genetically modified  citrus tristeza virus developed to protect orange trees.
  • It is not simply a call for increased transparency by funders and researchers  - unless it is combined with a willingness and framework  to alter the goals  to reflect obvious global concerns.


Where is the  current funding for lab-modified self-spreading vaccines coming from?

  •  EU-Horisons 2020 "A safe DIVA vaccine for African Swine Fever control and eradication” called VACDIVA, 2019- 2023, (862874)


  •  NIH -USA "A mathematical theory of transmissible vaccines", 2016 -2021, (R01GM122079) 


  • DARPA "Prediction of spillover potential and interventional en masse animal vaccination to prevent emerging pathogen threats in current and future zones of US military operation” also called PREEMPT, 2018-2022, ( D18AC00028 one part of a broader program ) 


What applications have been proposals for lab-modified self-spreading viruses ?

  • The figure below tries to summarise proposed applications and wether development efforts were undertaken. Only those three techniques under the green box can be viewed as vaccination. Blue = no current development activity as fare as we are aware, Pink = current development activities.



  • HEGAAs (far right of figure)  are described in an earlier companion website



The EU funded VACDIVA  project is modifying viruses that could act as vaccines to African Swine Fever. Is it really clear that the project may include the development of lab-modified self-spreading vaccines?

  • While there is a degree of ambiguity about wether self-spreading vaccines are a part of this work program there are a number of lines of evidence to indicate that this is the case. 
  • Firstly quotes including the following from the person in charge of the VACDIVA project 


At least one real-world field study supports the idea that transmissible vaccines can be both safe and effective at eradicating a deadly disease in wildlife. In the 1990s, a team led by José Manuel Sánchez-Vizcaíno, a veterinarian then at the Animal Health Research Center in Madrid, created a recombinant live vaccine to protect rabbits from a lethal hemorrhagic disease. When they tested it on a small island off the coast of Spain, the vaccine seemed to spread to more than half of the local rabbit population.

Despite that apparent success, other field studies have not followed: According to Sánchez-Vizcaíno, transmissible vaccines have not drawn much interest from pharmaceutical companies because they look unprofitable. Nevertheless, he is working on a recombinant viral vaccine against African swine fever that would spread for only a few hours or days. With new molecular biology techniques, researchers can fine-tune vaccines to have predetermined lifetimes, which could eliminate concerns over unwanted mutations or ongoing evolution of the vaccine organism.

Ortega, Rodrigo Pérez. “Can Vaccines for Wildlife Prevent Human Pandemics?” Quanta Magazine, 2020. https://www.quantamagazine.org/can-vaccines-for-wildlife-prevent-human-pandemics-20200824/



  • As mentioned above  there is a clear link to the earlier program that developed and field tested a self-spreading rabbit vaccine.


Bárcena, Juan, Mónica Morales, Belén Vázquez, José A. Boga, Francisco Parra, Javier Lucientes, Albert Pagès-Manté, José M. Sánchez-Vizcaíno, Rafael Blasco, and Juan M. Torres. “Horizontal Transmissible Protection against Myxomatosis and Rabbit Hemorrhagic Disease by Using a Recombinant Myxoma Virus.” Journal of Virology 74, no. 3 (February 2000): 1114–23. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC111445/.


Torres, Juan M, Miguel A Ramı́rez, Mónica Morales, Juan Bárcena, Belén Vázquez, Enric Espuña, Albert Pagès-Manté, and José M Sánchez-Vizcaı́no. “Safety Evaluation of a Recombinant Myxoma-RHDV Virus Inducing Horizontal Transmissible Protection against Myxomatosis and Rabbit Haemorrhagic Disease.” Vaccine 19, no. 2 (September 15, 2000): 174–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0264-410X(00)00183-3.


Torres, Juan M, Carmen Sánchez, Miguel A Ramı́rez, Mónica Morales, Juan Bárcena, Joan Ferrer, Enric Espuña, Albert Pagès-Manté, and José M Sánchez-Vizcaı́no. “First Field Trial of a Transmissible Recombinant Vaccine against Myxomatosis and Rabbit Hemorrhagic Disease.” Vaccine 19, no. 31 (August 14, 2001): 4536–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0264-410X(01)00184-0.


  • VACDIVA is clearly involved with the development of  vaccines deployed through conventional approaches, such as oral baits or by injection of individual pigs. However,  there is also a current focus the use of a wild virus isolates like one sampled in Latvia in 2017 called Lv17/WB/Rie1.  Infection with this Isolate results in mild symptoms and a degree of immunity to reinfection.  The description of this non lab-modified virus is described in citation (15) in the Science article, this reference establishes that this wild isolate is self-spreading. However, as pointed out in a recent article entitled  "No hasty solutions for African swine fever-African swine fever vaccines could pose risk of causing disease and spreading the virus further” this isolate is far from ideal in terms of controlling disease. Consequently,  laboratory manipulation of this or other isolates to attenuate them further may at some point be considered a desirable approach (see quote below).

These safety issues were also observed using a naturally attenuated ASFV [African swine fever virus] strain from Latvia (Lv17/ WB/Rie1) (14). This virus caused clinical signs of ASF [African swine fever] in pigs, including joint swelling, which is associated with a chronic form of ASF (15). In addition, the vaccine replicated to high concentrations in blood and spread to pigs on contact. Replication of the virulent virus was not sufficiently controlled, and the pigs shed the virulent virus sporadically and could therefore spread ASF to other animals (14), potentially failing to stop the epidemic. Such safety issues should be considered during animal testing of vaccine candidates. 



The Science article refers to erosion of an evidence-based norm.  What distinguishes evidence-based norm erosion from other scientific processes that legitimately alter norms?

  • It is the adequacy of the discussions on why the established bodies of evidence or their widespread interpretations are refuted.
  • Our use of  the word Norm is defined as follows: the behaviours and practices among disciplines of scientists (and their funders) that collectively contribute to cultures of responsibility, awareness and vigilance that maximise the beneficial intent of their contribution to the global community, as well as minimising those activities that are fundamentally intolerable (see more details).
  • We speculate (though not in the article) that norm erosion may actually be  a common unrecognised  factor in a number of areas of scientific controversy (its impact may be  particularly pronounced when a “develop first explain later” approach is pursued).
  • We make clear in the article that “Theoretical claims of suppressed viral evolution and their assumed predetermined life-times in the environment currently remain peripheral within the scientific community.”.  However, given the speed at which self-spreading vaccines can be assembled, it is important that discussions precede funding or development activities.  Many of the fundamental issues relating to ethics, safety and international law do not require data to be generated on specific applications to make progress. 
  • Finally the link between self-spreading wildlife killing or sterilising approaches and self-spreading wildlife vaccination are substantial, and more than sufficient in our opinion that they can, and should be, discussed in the same policy framework. Making this connection is not limited to us and is evidenced by the frequency with which the Spanish rabbit vaccine field trials and the Australian pest killing/sterilising development programs are considered in the same documents, be they scientific, regulatory or in the media. While it is undoubtedly the case that killing or sterilising wildlife/pests is, for some, more emotive than their vaccination, it remains the case that former programs are those with the most extensive applied research body of published material and so should not be ignored (this remains the case even if the current cycle of interest currently appears to be more focused on vaccination). Consequently,  it is critical to not overlook the fact that  a considerable number of valuable and highly relevant documents were generated, some in the earlier cycle of interest in self-spreading viral proposals - see below and the references cited in them. 

             L. A. Hinds, Feasibility of immunocontraception for managing stoats in New Zealand-page 94, 109 (2000)

             W. R. Henderson, E. C. Murphy, Pest or prized possession? Genetically modified biocontrol from an international perspective. Wildlife Research. 34, 578 (2007).

             Conference Of The Parties To The Convention On Biological Diversity, Report of the Canada-Norway expert workshop on risk assessment for emerging applications of living modified organisms UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/4/INF/13, 39 (2007).

            E. Angulo, B. Gilna, When biotech crosses borders– international governance of self-dispersive GMOs purposefully released for public health, controlling invasive species and pests, and treating wildlife. Nature Biotechnology (2008), doi:10.1038/nbt0308-277.

            E. Angulo, B. Cooke, First synthesize new viruses then regulate their release? The case of the wild rabbit. Molecular Ecology. 11, 2703–2709 (2002).

            G. Verheugen, Commission directive 2009/9/EC of 10 February 2009 amending Directive 2001/82/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Community code relating to medicinal products for veterinary use, 52 (2009).

             European Medicines Agency, Guideline on live recombinant vector vaccines for veterinary use (CVMP), 6 (2004).

             National Biotechnology Authority Zimbabwe, Procedure for assessment of release of human vaccine (2018), (available at http://bch.cbd.int/database/record.shtml?documentid=113303).

             International Office of Epizootics, Biological Standards Commission, OIE Manual of diagnostic tests and vaccines for terrestrial animals: (mammals, birds and bees), Article 4.18.6.2.c (2018).



Is the DARPA  administered PREEMPT program and specifically its project entitled  "Prediction of spillover potential and interventional en masse animal vaccination to prevent emerging pathogen threats in current and future zones of US military operation” developing lab-modified self-spreading vaccines?

  • While there may be a degree of ambiguity reading press releases or websites when they refer to  “unique animal vaccination tool” or “a novel vaccine” , there are multiple compelling lines of evidence that provide a degree of clarity by what is meant, in this project that " will initially focus on Lassa fever in rats and Ebola in non-human primates”.
  • Firstly, while conventional vaccine deployment or even spraying vaccines may be conceivable for non-human primate species, it is not credible for fast breeding rodents that live with humans.  Particularly as any deployment approach would need to achieve very high coverage and persistence  if the aim is viral eradication, rather than just risk reduction, which is repeatedly promoted. The central role of self-spreading vaccines in this project is unambiguously clarified in some project documents:


"the UC Davis-led PREEMPT project is building an innovative new countermeasure designed to preemptively eliminate highly pathogenic zoonotic viruses in their wildlife hosts, while balancing conservation goals to assure wildlife well-being and health. We are creating the world’s first prototype of a self-disseminating vaccine designed to induce a high level of herd immunity (wildlife population level protection) against Lassa virus (LASV) and Ebola,” 

[..]

Our PREEMPT consortium is now moving forward with additional research to establish a reliable and safe method of control on this technology, effectively designing and testing an “off-switch” to impose a ‘life-span’ on the vaccine within each inoculated animal. Long-term, we will design versions of this vaccine using the specific type of CMV found in rodent species in Sierra Leone and the West Africa region 

quote from the March 2020  Big win. New countermeasures to eliminate pandemic risk.pdf, other links on the news page support a central focus on self-spreading vaccines. 

In the above quote we would question how new the idea of self-spreading vaccines are and, based on the Spanish and Australian work wether they would be the “world’s first prototype of a self-disseminating vaccine “.

TVG’s [The Vaccine Group's] novel technology is based on safe forms of cytomegaloviruses (CMV) that are naturally prevalent in nearly all animals, including humans. The vaccines are created by modifying the CMV viruses – inserting small regions of the viral pathogen being targeted to stimulate immune responses against the virus prior to possible exposure.

Because the resulting vaccine is CMV-based, it has the potential for wide uptake within an animal community. Once a critical mass of animals has been immunised, the zoonotic disease no longer poses a danger to humans.

TVG and its partners will explore the safety and efficacy of such scalable countermeasures and delivery mechanisms. 

quote from 2019 TVG press release 

  • Secondly, in the  January 2018 DARPA call to bid for PREEMPT contracts (page 10) it is clearly specified that self-spreading  lab-modified vaccines are permissible (termed “transmissible recombinant vaccines”) . Though a number of control measures are encouraged (but not mandated). 


2. Scalable delivery methods

Proposers must describe scalable approaches to deliver the preemptive therapeutic to achieve animal and/or vector population-level control of the targeted virus, including strategies for reaching less accessible animal reservoirs (e.g., rodents or non-human primates). Approaches that enable host-to-host therapeutic distribution (i.e., do not require individual treatment) that are self-limiting, only activate when the viral pathogen target is present, and/or have a controllable “on/off-switch” are encouraged. Potential scalable methods of inoculation may include, but are not limited to:

1) Self-disseminating treatments or preventives (e.g., transmissible recombinant vaccines, therapeutic interfering particles, or self-spreading antiviral therapies).

2) Bait vaccination or treatment of wild or domestic animals.

3) Spray-based methods.



In the web address what does the acronym  HEVIMAs stand for? 

  • Horizontal Environmental Vertebrate Immune Manipulation Agents
  • HEVIMAs are viruses which have been genetically modified to  raise antibodies in vertebrate target species when intentionally released into the environment AND have distinct deployment strategies that fundamentally rely on their capacity to  be self-spreading.
  • The word “horizontal” comes from their ability to be transmitted in the environment by infection 
  • The word “environmental” comes from the intention for these genetically modified viruses to be dispersed into the environment.
  • The words “Vertebrate Immune Manipulation Agents ” rather than just the word "vaccines” comes from the fact that through manipulating the vertebrate immune system it is possible to also kill or sterilise vertebrates.
  • On the figure on this page entitled “Modified lab-modified self-spreading viruses developed for use in the environment “ all the approaches except “crop management”  can be HEVIMAs.
  • The acronym HEVIMA was not used in the Science article.



Was the USA National Institute of Health program  "A mathematical theory of transmissible vaccines” an entirely theoretical project with no laboratory  development of vaccines ? 

  • Yes, this program did not fund  any laboratory development of vaccines.
  •  It was however the first funded program after the approximately decade gap of no interest between 2007 and 2016, and as such likely played a role in normalising the acceptability of self-spreading vaccines for some researchers.
  • Example of the publications generated by this project  that ran from 2016 -2022 include.


Basinski, Andrew J., Scott L. Nuismer, and Christopher H. Remien. “A Little Goes a Long Way: Weak Vaccine Transmission Facilitates Oral Vaccination Campaigns against Zoonotic Pathogens.” Edited by David Joseph Diemert. PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases 13, no. 3 (March 8, 2019): e0007251. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0007251.

Basinski, Andrew J., Tanner J. Varrelman, Mark W. Smithson, Ryan H. May, Christopher H. Remien, and Scott L. Nuismer. “Evaluating the Promise of Recombinant Transmissible Vaccines.” Vaccine 36, no. 5 (January 29, 2018): 675–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.12.037.

Bull, James J., Scott L. Nuismer, and Rustom Antia. “Recombinant Vector Vaccine Evolution.” Edited by Viktor Müller. PLOS Computational Biology 15, no. 7 (July 19, 2019): e1006857. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006857.

Bull, James J., Mark W. Smithson, and Scott L. Nuismer. “Transmissible Viral Vaccines.” Trends in Microbiology 26, no. 1 (January 1, 2018): 6–15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tim.2017.09.007.

This paper was accompanied by this short youtube explainer. Note  transmissible vaccine = self-spreading vaccine 


Bull, James, Scott L. Nuismer, and Rustom Antia. “Recombinant Vector Vaccines and Within-Host Evolution.” Preprint. Evolutionary Biology, February 8, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1101/545087.

Layman, Nathan C., Beth M. Tuschhoff, Andrew J. Basinski, Christopher H. Remien, James J. Bull, and Scott L. Nuismer. “Suppressing Evolution in Genetically Engineered Systems through Repeated Supplementation.” Evolutionary Applications, November 6, 2020, eva.13119. https://doi.org/10.1111/eva.13119.

Layman, Nathan C, Beth M Tuschhoff, and Scott L Nuismer. “Designing Transmissible Viral Vaccines for Evolutionary Robustness and Maximum Efficiency.” Virus Evolution 7, no. 1 (January 20, 2021): veab002. https://doi.org/10.1093/ve/veab002.

Nuismer, Scott, and James Bull. “How to Stop Pandemics.” New Scientist 247, no. 3296 (August 2020): 23. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0262-4079(20)31454-8.

Nuismer, Scott L., Benjamin M. Althouse, Ryan May, James J. Bull, Sean P. Stromberg, and Rustom Antia. “Eradicating Infectious Disease Using Weakly Transmissible Vaccines.” Proc. R. Soc. B 283, no. 1841 (October 26, 2016): 20161903. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2016.1903.

Nuismer, Scott L., Andrew Basinski, and James J. Bull. “Evolution and Containment of Transmissible Recombinant Vector Vaccines.” Evolutionary Applications 0, no. 0 (May 2, 2019). https://doi.org/10.1111/eva.12806.

Nuismer, Scott L., and James J. Bull. “Self-Disseminating Vaccines to Suppress Zoonoses.” Nature Ecology & Evolution, July 27, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-020-1254-y.

Nuismer, Scott L., Ryan May, Andrew Basinski, and Christopher H. Remien. “Controlling Epidemics with Transmissible Vaccines.” PLOS ONE 13, no. 5 (May 10, 2018): e0196978. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0196978.

Paff, Matthew L., Scott L. Nuismer, Andrew D. Ellington, Ian J. Molineux, Ryan H. May, and James J. Bull. “Design and Engineering of a Transmissible Antiviral Defense.” Journal of Biological Engineering 10, no. 1 (December 2016). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13036-016-0033-4.

Remien, Christopher H, and Scott L Nuismer. “Reservoir Population Dynamics and Pathogen Epidemiology Drive Pathogen Genetic Diversity, Spillover, and Emergence.” Preprint. Epidemiology, August 22, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.08.19.20178145.

Smithson, Mark W., Andrew J. Basinki, Scott L. Nuismer, and James J. Bull. “Transmissible Vaccines Whose Dissemination Rates Vary through Time, with Applications to Wildlife.” Vaccine 37, no. 9 (February 21, 2019): 1153–59. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2019.01.018.

Varrelman, Tanner J., Andrew J. Basinski, Christopher H. Remien, and Scott L. Nuismer. “Transmissible Vaccines in Heterogeneous Populations: Implications for Vaccine Design.” One Health 7 (June 1, 2019): 100084. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.onehlt.2019.100084.


Is your article the first time a call has been made about the pressing need for  informed discussions at international forums to resolve obvious and outstanding questions relating to lab-modified self-spreading viruses ?

  • No, earlier very eloquent and thoughtful calls have been made by a number of other researchers, particularly notable are those by Dr. Elena Angulo (Université Paris-Saclay).


Angulo, E., and B. Cooke. “First Synthesize New Viruses Then Regulate Their Release? The Case of the Wild Rabbit.” Molecular Ecology 11, no. 12 (December 1, 2002): 2703–9. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-294X.2002.01635.x.

Angulo, Elena, and Juan Bárcena. “Towards a Unique and Transmissible Vaccine against Myxomatosis and Rabbit Haemorrhagic Disease for Rabbit Populations.” Wildlife Research 34, no. 7 (2007): 567. https://doi.org/10.1071/WR06160.

Angulo, Elena, and Ben Gilna. “When Biotech Crosses Borders– International Governance of Self-Dispersive GMOs Purposefully Released for Public Health, Controlling Invasive Species and Pests, and Treating Wildlife.” Nature Biotechnology, March 1, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1038/nbt0308-277.

  • Dr. Elena Angulo is an expert on biological invasions  and is also very knowledgeable about the 2000 Spanish development program and field trial, described above and discussed on the following page.

 

If you had time to read one scientific article or two news articles on this topic what would they be?



What date was the escape of a rabbit hemorrhagic disease virus from a limited field trial at an Australian high-security island laboratory?

  • As we make clear in the article text that  the escape of rabbit hemorrhagic disease virus was not part of the Australian programs to  develop approaches to sterilize or kill pest wildlife (foxes, mice, and rabbits) using lab-modified self-spreading viruses.   The field trial was part of another unrelated program to evaluate wild isolates of viruses that were not going to be lab-modified, consequently the virus that escaped does not meet the definition of modified self-spreading viruses as defined in Box 1 of our article (also on the Homepage of this site).
  • The escape occurred in September 1995   K. A. McColl, J. C. Merchant, J. Hardy, B. D. Cooke, A. Robinson, H. A. Westbury, Evidence for insect transmission of rabbit haemorrhagic disease virus. Epidemiology & Infection. 129, 655-663 (2002)or see report for more details. 
  • As far as precedents  for responsibility or claims of compensation for an escaped virus it is notable that New Zealand apparently never asked or received for compensation for the illegal transpiration of this virus into its territory in 1997. This is despite preemptively declaring the virus an ‘unwanted organism’ under its Biosecurity Act  and increasing vigilance at its borders because of it. This declaration also made the possession and deliberate spreading of the virus illegal. In an 1996 application to import the virus as a biocontrol agent into New Zealand as also rejected.   However, none of this was sufficient to stop the intentional  illegal importation  of the virus to New Zealand in 1997. Challenging the assumption that a virus will stay where it is permitted by regulators, particularly where some interested party perceives the virus is successful in achieving a desired goal).  These details come from a very insightful article written by Former Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of New Zealand, which is further quoted here.
  • It is conceivable that funding for Australian programs to  develop multiple approaches to sterilize or kill pest wildlife (foxes, mice, and rabbits) using lab-modified self-spreading viruses, may have commenced after the 1995 escape (though it probably occurred during the funded period).  It appears reasonable to assume its impact on undermining confidence in outdoor field trials of self-spreading viruses would have been significant. Though clearly not to the extent that it stopped the initiation of the Spanish lab-modified self-spreading vaccine program or the continuation of the Australian program.
  • The trial from which the unauthorised release occurred  was held on Wardang Island and had the aim to evaluate the virulence, transmissibility and persistence of the virus, and to consider animal welfare issues associated with its use (though the virus has been circulating in Europe starting 1988).







General Note: It is almost always possible, in any multi-partner project,  to present groups or individuals that are not directly engaged in a given potentially controversial activity.  This is not the same as establishing that the activity is not,  or was not, an objective of the wider funded project. Furthermore, claims of transparency have limited value unless they are combined with a willingness and framework  to alter goals  to reflect obvious global concerns.


Given the importance to  vaccination to all our lives over the past 100 years choosing not to clearly address obvious issues of global concern makes the current model of develop first and explain later an especially unwise path. This is particularly  the case for modified self-spreading viruses, that in many ways appears to be designed to get carried away.  


7 January 2022
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